

Message Text

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SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 15 (SALT TWO-468)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR
JOHNSON AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF OCTOBER 15, 1974.

QUOTE

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON

OCTOBER 15, 1974

MR. MINISTER:

AT OUR LAST MEETING I BEGAN MY REVIEW OF THE CONCEPTS THAT
WE BELIEVE WOULD PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK FOR AN EQUITABLE AGREEMENT
TO LIMIT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES UNTIL
1985. YOU WILL RECALL THAT I COVERED OUR CONCEPTS RELATING TO
QUANTITATIVE LIMITATIONS, QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS, AND REDUCTIONS.

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TODAY I WILL CONCLUDE THAT REVIEW.

V

ONE CONCEPT THAT WILL, WE BELIEVE, ENHANCE STABILITY IS THAT A NEW AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT CODIFY THE EXISTING AND PROJECTED STRATEGIC PROGRAMS OF THE TWO SIDES. RATHER, A NEW AGREEMENT SHOULD CONSTRAIN THE PACE AND THE MAGNITUDE OF BOTH QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. IN THIS REGARD, THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS THE PRINCIPLE OF AGREED, MUTUAL AND EQUITABLE RESTRAINT IN THE MODERIZATION AND REPLACEMENT OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS.

VI

TURNING TO ANOTHER CONCEPT, OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS ARE IN ACCORD THAT ANY AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS MUST BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIABLE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. THIS AGREED REQUIREMENT OF ADEQUATE VERIFIABILITY MUST BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION IN FORMULATING ALL PROVISIONS OF AN AGREEMENT. IN CERTAIN CASES, SUCH AS IN LIMITATIONS ON MIRV DEPLOYMENTS, THERE WILL BE A NEED TO INCLUDE IN THE AGREEMENT SPECIAL MEASURES TO PERMIT ADEQUATE VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

VII

IN ADDRESSING THE ISSUES BEFORE US, THE UNITED STATES HAS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT OUR REALIZATION THAT EACH SIDE, IN ITS PERCEPTION OF ITS OWN SECURITY REQUIREMENTS, IS PARTICULARLY INFLUENCED BY ITS ESTIMATE OF THE PRESENT AND PROSPECTIVE STRATEGIC CAPABILITY OF THE OTHER SIDE. CONSEQUENTLY, THERE IS AN INTERACTION BETWEEN THE DECISIONS TAKEN BY EACH SIDE CONCERNING THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE CENTRAL STRATEGIC FORCES. THIS INTERACTION LEADS TO A FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE RESULTING FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES. THIS FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIP IS ITSELF ONE OF THE MOST CONVINCING REASONS WHY IT IS IN OUR MUTUAL INTEREST TO ACHIEVE A NEW AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

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THE CHARACTERISTICS, MAGNITUDE AND DEPLOYMENT RATES OF SOVIET STRATEGIC PROGRAMS WILL HAVE AN IMPACT ON U.S. PROGRAMS AND FORCE STRUCTURE IN ANY EVENT, AND ESPECIALLY IN THE ABSENCE OF AN AGREEMENT. THIS FACT IS, TO OUR MIND, ONE OF THE STRONGEST ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF OUR REACHING AN AGREEMENT. THE FUTURE U.S. STRATEGIC FORCE LEVEL WILL BE DETERMINED TO A MAJOR DEGREE BY THE OUTCOME OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, AND AS I HAVE SAID EARLIER, IT IS THE INTENTION OF THE UNITED STATES TO HAVE A STRATEGIC FORCE NO

LESS THAN THE STRATEGIC FORCE OF THE SOVIET UNION, EITHER IN REALITY OR PERCEPTION. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT TOGETHER WE CAN ACHIEVE AN EQUITABLE NEW AGREEMENT COVERING BOTH QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

IT IS WITH THIS NEED FOR AN EQUITABLE AGREEMENT IN MIND THAT WE HAVE ADVANCED THE CONCEPT OF A HIGH DEGREE OF EQUIVALENCE IN THE CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS OF BOTH SIDES. THIS CONCEPT, AS I HAVE SAID, PROVIDES FOR EQUITABLE TREATMENT OF THE FORCES OF EACH SIDE. BECAUSE OF THE FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STRATEGIC FORCES OF EACH SIDE, INCREASES IN THE NATURE AND LEVEL OF STRATEGIC ARMS DO NOT PRODUCE A CORRESPONDING INCREASE IN THE ACTUAL OR PERCEIVED SECURITY OF EITHER COUNTRY. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT THE UNITED STATES FAVORS NOT ONLY LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, BUT BELIEVES THAT STABILITY CAN BE ENHANCED AND EQUALITY PRESERVED AT A LOWER LEVEL OF FORCES THAN NOW EXISTS ON BOTH SIDES.

VIII

THE NEED TO ENHANCE STABILITY IN THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IS, IN THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES, A FUNDAMENTAL CRITERION FOR ASSESSING THE SECURITY AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF POSSIBLE PROVISIONS FOR A NEW AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. AS I HAVE ALREADY POINTED OUT ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS, THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED TO ACHIEVING AN AGREEMENT THAT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO STABILITY BOTH IN THE LONG-TERM STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND IN TIME OF CRISIS.

ACCORDINGLY, WE BELIEVE A NEW AGREEMENT SHOULD PROVIDE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF A LONG-TERM STABLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES OF BOTH SIDES IN ORDER TO PRECLUDE
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EITHER SIDE FROM SEEING A NECESSITY TO INCREASE ITS STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCE CAPABILITIES IN ORDER TO AVOID BEING PLACED AT A STRATEGIC DISADVANTAGE. SIMILARLY, IN ORDER TO PRESERVE STABILITY IN TIME OF CRISIS, WE BELIEVE A NEW AGREEMENT SHOULD PROVIDE FOR EACH SIDE TO POSSESS, AND BE SEEN TO POSSESS, SUFFICIENT SECURE AND SURVIVABLE STRATEGIC FORCES THAT NO INCENTIVE EXISTS TO INITIATE THE USE OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

IX

IN SETTING FORTH THESE CONCEPTS, WE ARE MINDFUL OF THE NEW OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED FOR OUR NEGOTIATIONS BY THE DECISION OF OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS TO WORK OUT AN AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985. WE HAVE TAKEN INTO CAREFUL CONSIDERATION THE EFFECT OF THIS DEFINITE TIME PERIOD FOR A NEW AGREEMENT UPON THE ISSUES THAT CONFRONT US

IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS. WE BELIEVE THE MAIN TASK OF OUR TWO DELEGATIONS AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME IS TO SEEK TO BUILD A GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE NEW AGREEMENT.

THE CONCEPTS THAT I HAVE ADVANCED, IN THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES, SHOULD CONSTITUTE A BASIC FRAMEWORK WHICH WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES WHICH OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED SHOULD GUIDE OUR NEGOTIATIONS. I LOOK FORWARD, MR. MINISTER, TO HEARING YOUR FURTHER REFLECTIONS REGARDING THE CONCEPTS THAT I HAVE SET FORTH.

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